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Summary 
This report attempts to answer a rather deep question: To what extent can 
"pure" economics explain economic growth and technological change? By "pure" 
economics, it is meant the relationships governing the behavior of abstract enti- 
ties, producing abstract products or services for sale in an idealized competitive 
market. Pure economics, in the above sense, admits R&D and innovations of an 
unspecified kind; it also admits improvements (unspecified) and learning curves 
or experience curves. 
The report concludes, however, that the dynamic behavior of the product 
"life cycle" in specific cases, and the observed clustering of innovations in partic- 
ular fields at particular times, with periods of rapid progress followed by slow- 
downs, can only by explained by also taking into account the preexisting state of 
technology, and the laws of nature. It is argued that technological progress is 
marked not only by processes of relatively predictable incremental improvement 
(e.g., "learning curves"), but also by a series of discrete "barriers" and "break- 
throughs". These are not random events, although their exact timing is undoubt- 
edly very difficult to predict. 
The technological life cycle can be defined as the period from a major 
breakthrough opening up a new territory for exploitation to the next major bar- 
rier. It is characterized, in part, by a high initial marginal productivity of R&D, 
and a more or less continuous decline thereafter, as the territory is gradually 
exhausted. This model is qualitatively consistent with the well-known "S-shaped 
curve" phenomenon, describing measures of technological performance over time, 
as well as a number of other observed phenomena. 

Foreword 
Two strands of argument are interwoven in this report. The first strand is that 
technological innovation is a major driver of economic growth. The second 
strand is that technological innovation is also a consequence of economic activity. 
In the jargon of the profession, technological change is essentially endogenous, 
not exogenous (as has often been assumed for the sake of convenience). In short, 
technological innovation and economic growth are related like the chicken and 
the egg: to give either priority over the other is futile. 
Of course, economists have known this for some time. But more is needed. 
It is not quite enough to postulate microeconomic mechanisms to explain why 
entrepreneurs invest in R&D. We also need to understand better the charac- 
teristic technology life cycle and its relation with the better-known product or 
industry life cycle. These are major themes of the TES program at IIASA. Pro- 
fessor Ayres addresses the issue squarely in this report and suggests some direc- 
tions for future research. 
THOMAS H. LEE 
Program Leader, 
Technology-Economy-Society 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
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THE INDUSTRY-TECHNOLOGY LIFE CYCLE: 
AN INTEGRATING META-MODEL? 
Robert U. Ayres 
Background 
The life cycle is a cluster of related phenomena that the economic theory of tech- 
nological change should explain better. Used in economics, "life cycle" is, of 
course, a metaphor of succession taken from biology. The stages include concep- 
tion, birth, infancy, childhood, adolescence, maturity, senescence, and death [ I ] .  
Recognizably similar stages can easily be identified in the evolution of other enti- 
ties, such as a technology [2], a product [3], a firm, an industry, or perhaps even 
a nation. In fact, without stretching the metaphor unduly, a series of correspon- 
dences can be identified between the stages of the life cycles for technologies, 
products, and firms or industries. A stylized description of the life cycle follows. 
It is summarized in Tables 1-9. 
The life cycle of an industry begins with a major product innovation or 
technological breakthrough. Schumpeter saw the innovation as a major 
entrepreneurial act, preceded by invention and driven by the lure of supernormal 
monopoly profits. Schumpeter (1912) originally treated the creation of scientific 
knowledge and invention as exogenous to the economic system [4] .  In his later 
work, Schumpeter (1943) modified this view and allowed for the creation of tech- 
nology (R&D) as a deliberate activity, especially in large firms. For a recent dis- 
cussion of the two Schumpeterian models, see Freeman (1982). 
The innovative product may or may not be immediately successful in the 
marketplace (infancy); but if it is successful, it quickly spawns both improve- 
ments and imitators. The second stage of the cycle (childhood), also described 
implicitly by Schumpeter, can be characterized as "imitative innovation". At 
this time there is typically an intense competition among entrepreneurs for 
market niches, based primarily on design and cost-effectiveness improvements, 
over the initial entrant. Inventors and innovators try to protect their technolo- 
gies through patents and secrecy, but diffusion of knowledge occurs inevitably. 
Only the largest and most dominant firms can expect to capture more than a 
small proportion of the total benefits of an invention. In this connection, there 
is a distinct difference between product and process invention. The latter is 
easier to protect, especially after firms have grown large. However, further inno- 
vation during this period of rapid flux is sometimes motivated by a perceived 
need to invent around a set of dominant patents [5]. Frequently, the competition 
Table 1 .  A summary of the life cycle: technology. 
Life 
cycle 
stage 
Logistics, 
transport, 
Diversity Scale and Labor inventory, 
versus process require- handling, 
standard technology ments technology 
INFANCY Unique Custom; High labor Little concern 
ad hoe intensity, w/ inventory, 
multi- high-skill1 low relative 
purpose workers cost of trans- 
machines needed port, manual 
handling 
CHILDHOOD Diversity Small Expansion Inventory costs 
of types & batch of labor increase sharply, 
imitators job shop, force, but transport cost 
manual minimal increase, manual 
operation "deskilling" handling 
ADOLESCENCE Increasing Medium to Embodiment High inventory, 
standardiza- large batch; of labor high transport 
tion, fewer special skills in costs, semi-auto 
models; machines & machines handling 
faster diffusion fixtures 
MATURITY High degree "Mass" ; Low labor Reduced 
of standardi- dedicated intensity, inventory, 
zation, mechani- low skill high 
approaching zation, for direct transport, 
saturation transfer mfg. jobs; mechanized 
lines etc. High skill handling 
for indirect 
& managerial 
jobs 
SENESCENCE Commodity - 
like 
begins even earlier a t  the R&D stage, as  a number of would-be innovators simul- 
taneously seek to  develop a new product for a widely recognized potential 
market. Entry to  the new industry is still easy, in this stage, though many 
would-be entrants fail. 
The  transition from the second stage (childhood) to  the third stage (adoles- 
cence) can probably best be characterized as the beginning of consolidation, i.e., 
the period when the number of entrants to  the industry per year is first exceeded 
by the number of departures. At this period, expansion is most rapid. 
Eventually, scale economies and the accumulation of "experience" [61 or 
"learning by doing" achieved by the most successful survivors begins to raise 
barriers t o  new entrants .  Th i s  characterizes t h e  th i rd  s tage  of the  cycle, adoles- 
cence. T h e  min imum investment required grows larger a n d  the  requisite "know- 
how" resides in a smaller a n d  smaller number  of existing organizations a n d  their  
key employees. As t ime passes, q u a n t u m  (nonincremental) product improve- 
men t s  seem t o  become harder t o  achieve. There  a re  declining re turns  for R&D, 
a n d  t h e  basis for competition among t h e  survivors shifts toward price-cutting 
a n d  marketing.  Eventually, a "shakeoutn is likely t o  occur [7]. T h e  need t o  
Table 2. A summary of the life cycle: strategic management. 
Life cycle Investment 
Stage 
- 
strategy 
INFANCY Invest in 
the pro- 
duct 
CHILDHOOD Emphasize 
product 
R&D 
ADOLESCENCE Expand 
markets, 
cut costs, 
exploit 
economies 
of scale; 
shift to 
process R&D 
MATURITY Emphasize 
process 
R&D; 
diversity 
SENESCENCE Disinvest: 
sell assets 
including 
technology 
to  low-cost 
competitors 
Capital 
intensity 
Low capital 
intensity 
maximum 
risk 
premium 
Growing 
investment 
in mfg. 
facilities; 
declining 
risk 
Increasing 
investment 
in mfg. 
facilities; 
declining 
risk 
High 
capital 
intensity, 
minimum 
risk 
premium 
Maximum 
capital 
intensity 
Location Oroanitation 
Near 
technical 
talent pool 
or source 
of finan- 
cial backing 
Flexible, non- 
hierarchic; 
technical 
skills on top 
Near 
primary 
market(s); 
many 
warehouses 
and 
variants 
Transition 
to  larger, 
centralized 
facilities; 
long 
distribution 
channels 
Based on 
lowest-cost 
labor (or 
capital) ; 
moves 
"offshore" 
Loses 
national 
identity 
Still flexible; 
mfg. skills 
on top; 
marketing 
skills in- 
creasingly 
important 
Bureau- 
cratizing; 
organiza- 
tional and 
marketing 
skills on 
top 
Bureaucratic, 
financial. 
and legal 
skills on 
top 
Bureau- 
cratic, 
financial and 
legal skills 
on top 
Table 9. A summary of the life cycle: market and industry structure. 
Life stage Price elasticity Entry/ezit Competition 
INFANCY Not applicable Easy entry Natural 
monopoly of 
innovator 
CHILDHOOD High elasticity Many new Rapid imitation; 
entrants increasing 
competition 
ADOLESCENCE Declining "Shakeout" Transition and 
elasticity mergers, entry consolidation 
is hard, of survivors 
more exits 
MATURITY Low No new 
elasticity entry 
Stable 
oligopoly 
SENESCENCE Negligible More mergers Unstable; original 
elasticity and failures leaders begin 
to drop out 
exploit economies of scale in manufacturing and marketing encourages consolida- 
tion of niches and product standardization. This permits larger-scale production 
and further increased productivity (Verdoorn's law), which in turn permits lower 
prices. Given nonzero price elasticity of demand, this in turn translates into 
larger markets, a mechanism emphasized by Salter (1960). During this stage, 
the industry may enjoy its maximum rate of expansion. 
From the technological point of view, the dominant process during this 
stage is diffusion (81, although the connotation of technological or entrepreneurial 
passivity on the part of the producer is misleading. The role of demand pull is 
clearly an important element of the diffusion process, as are the invention and 
innovation processes. However, the producer's technological response to market 
signals and his investment in marketing can, in many cases, strongly influence 
the diffusion process. 
The fourth major stage (maturity) is reached when markets are becoming 
saturated and the price elasticity of demand falls toward unity, or even below. 
During this stage, the product becomes increasingly standardized. In late matu- 
rity (or senescence), it tends to become a commodity. Product innovation tends 
to be slow and planned, or nonexistent, for a standardized product. Thus, super- 
normal profits are possible a t  this stage only to the extent that markets are 
incontestable, i.e., barriers to market entry permit monopoly pricing (Baumol, 
1982). In fact, by commonplace observation, many (but not all) technologically 
mature industries tend to  be dominated by a few large firms. To  the extent that 
highly capital-intensive production methods are adopted, both product and pro- 
cess innovation are less attractive than earlier. [The problem arises from the 
well-known inflexibility of traditional mass production technology, which makes 
both product and process innovation forbiddingly expensive (Abernathy, 1978).] 
This constitutes an effective entry barrier to small or new firms. 
A further implication of the life cycle, noted by Vernon (1966) and others, 
is that production capacity for mature products tends to move from high-wage to 
low-wage countries, as shown in Figure 1. This is the most straightforward 
explanation of the so-called Leontief paradox in trade theory [9]. The migration 
of manufacturing industry from the USA to third world countries such as Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Brazil, and Mexico is clearly evident in recent years. 
The "maturity hypothesisn, as applied to the economy as a whole, has been 
advanced particularly by Kindleberger (1953, 1962, and 1979). A major contri- 
bution in the international context is Olson's institutional sclerosis theory. 
Olson (1982) emphasizes the role of extended periods of political stability in per- 
mitting the accumulation of powerful and protected special interest lobbies and 
legislation that interfere with market mechanisms for resource allocation and 
thus reduce economic efficiency. 
While many aspects of the life cycle have been elucidated, some gaps 
remain. In particular, the "aging" process and the apparent slowdown in inno- 
vation in mature industries, as contrasted with a higher rate of innovation in 
L'adole~~ent" industries, are not yet explained adequately by either neoclassical 
equilibrium approaches or by dynamic disequilibrium models in the Schum- 
peterian tradition. 
At this point, the so-called "evolutionary" model (or family of models) ela- 
borated by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982) can be regarded as a 
promising alternative to neoclassical theories of economic growth. However, the 
issue particularly addressed by Nelson and Winter up to now has been whether 
their evolutionary nonequilibrium, nonoptimizing model can account for more or 
less continuous economic growth at  the macro level as well as (or better than) 
traditional neoclassical equilibrium models. Their critique of orthodox theory is 
primarily directed at  the interface between pure (neoclassical) economics and 
human and organizational behavior. 
The critique offered in this paper is primarily directed, by contrast, at  the 
other end of the spectrum: the interface of orthodox economics with the laws of 
nature (i.e., with the subject matter of engineering and science). It  is in no way 
inconsistent with the Nelson-Winter point of view, except in minor respects, but 
may be regarded as complementary to it. 
In summary, existing economic theories do not appear to offer fully satis- 
factory microeconomic explanations of several key phenomena: 
( I )  The occurrence of major breakthroughs 1101 from time to time. 
(2) The cluster of related innovations and improvements that tends to follow a 
major breakthrough. 
(3) The subsequent maturation and aging process, with its characteristic slow- 
down in the rate of technological progress, product standardization, and so 
on. 
(4) The possible relationship of the above to "long waves" or Kondratieff 
cycles. This phenomenon has been the subject of recurring debates among 
economists since 1913. There has been a recent revival of interest, 
occasioned by the present worldwide recession. Various theories have been 
presented t o  explain long waves, but the subject is highly controversial, t o  
say the least. I will return to  this topic later. 
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Figure 1. The product life cycle (Ayres, 1984, adapted from Vernon, 1966). 
Technological Breakthroughs 
As noted above, there is a widespread view among mainstream economists that 
the specific features of technological change are essentially unpredictable, except 
in the statistical sense that investment in R&D can be expected to generate use- 
ful new ideas. The contemporary orthodox view is reasonably well summarized 
by Heertje: "Technical knowledge, being the product of a production process in 
which scarce resources are allocated, can be produced. We do not know ezactly 
what will be produced, but we are certain that we will know more after an un- 
known period" (Heertje, 1983: p. 48; emphasis added). 
Scientists and engineers tend to be less pessimistic about the possibility of 
forecasting what will be produced by R&D. In fact, most R&D is explicitly 
directed toward specific ends. There are many documented instances of simul- 
taneous invention [see, e.g., Ogburn and Thomas (1922)], which strongly sug- 
gests parallel independent searches, motivated by a widely shared perception of 
technological opportunity. The most famous such coincidence was that of Alex- 
ander Graham Bell and Elisha Gray, who filed documents with the U.S. Patent 
Office on the same day (February 14, 1876) claiming invention of the telephone. 
Bell worked in Boston; Gray, in Chicago. The point is that the invention of the 
telephone (among others) was certainly anticipated by many individuals who 
were familiar with telegraph technology before it actually occurred [ll]. The 
same is true of the majority of other important inventions. 
The Nelson-Winter model of technological progress is consistent with 
Heertje's view quoted above, viz, it assumes (for convenience) that the probabil- 
ity of a successful innovation is a function of R&D investment and is more or less 
independent of past history or other factors. Were it really so, technological 
progress would be much smoother than it actually is. In the real world, it is 
clear that opportunities within any field vary enormously from one time to 
another. Similarly, opportunities vary greatly from one field to another a t  any 
given time. Venture capital seeks identifiable opportunities, which can be defined 
as areas where a relatively small R&D effort may have a large economic payoff. 
It will be argued hereafter that such technological opportunities exist, from time 
to time, because of the changing state of technologies with respect to each other 
or vis-A-vis discontinuities in the laws of nature and the properties of matter. It 
follows, then, that many major opportunities are foreseeable, in principle, by 
technologically sophisticated persons. Indeed, the great majority have been 
foreseen in fact. 
To  explain this "discontinuity" hypothesis, it is useful to review, briefly, 
the technological history of the past two centuries. The major loci of inventive 
activity in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were iron-making, 
steam engines, railroads, textile manufacturing, and metal-working machine 
tools. In the second half of the nineteenth century steel, electrification, internal 
combustion engines, and chemicals took center stage. Automobiles and aircrart 
followed as  active areas of invention, followed by electronics (radio and TV) and 
polymer chemistry. After World War I1 came spinoffs such as nuclear 
technology, antibiotics, jet engines and rockets, the transistor, integrated cir- 
cuits, and the digital computer. Today composite materials, artificial intelli- 
gence, and biotechnology are the hot areas. 
Apart from the civilian applications of military technology, the pattern that 
characterized development in each of these major technologies (and numerous 
lesser ones) is roughly the same. Initially, a few visionary scientists and/or inven- 
tors worked for many years - even decades - to overcome a long-recognized bar- 
rier before the first successful prototype of the invention could be demonstrated. 
In most cases, there were a number of false starts. The history of flight is typi- 
cal. Even after the first successful prototype built by the Wright brothers, many 
more years elapsed before a product was finally ready for the "market" [12]. The 
initial barrier to progress may have been lack of knowledge, as in the early 
development of metallurgy, chemistry, and applications of electricity and radio. 
Around the turn of the nineteenth century, barriers tended to be the dearth of 
sufficiently strong or hard materials, inability to achieve desired levels of energy- 
density or power-to-weight, or the lack of sufficiently precise forming tools or 
means of measurement. In recent decades, the barrier has frequently been the 
lack of sufficiently fast, accurate, or reliable methods of manufacturing and/or 
information processing. Once the operative constraint is overcome, progress can 
be rapid - until the next technological barrier is reached. 
One of the famous historical examples of such a constraint was the problem 
of accurate navigation. Scientists in the seventeenth century, including Newton, 
recognized that this required accurate means of timekeeping that would - unlike 
available weight or pendulum-driven grandfather clocks - be unaffected by a 
ship's irregular motion. The ultimate technical solution to the problem was the 
spring-wound chronometer (or watch). Unfortunately, the requisite material 
(good-quality spring steel) could not easily be manufactured until the advent of 
Huntsman's crucible steel process in the 1740s. Huntsman's process opened up 
a variety of collateral economic possibilities in other areas as well. 
Newcomen's first steam engines overcame a constraint on the depth of coal 
mines. Watt's improved steam engine overcame a constraint on the availability 
of factory sites with access to water power. His engines, in turn, could not have 
been commercially produced without prior improvements in iron-making and 
iron-casting technology on the one hand, and Wilkinson's cylinder-boring 
machine (1774) on the other. Stevenson's first steam railroad locomotive (1818) 
could not have succeeded in practice until compact high-pressure engines became 
feasible, thanks to Trevithick, Woolf, and others around 1802-1804. Trevithick 
tried, but failed, to make a viable locomotive for mine haulage. His engine was 
too heavy, either for wooden rails or for the brittle cast iron rails available at  the 
time. Practical railroads depended on heavy-duty rolled iron rails (developed by 
Birkinshaw in 1821), as well as steel springs for the suspension, to facilitate 
adhesion of the driving wheels to the track. 
Engineering developments in the nineteenth century were continuously lim- 
ited by the slow rate of progress in ferrous metallurgy. Textile machinery, 
clocks, guns, sewing machines, and agricultural machinery could not be produced 
in quantity without accurate steam- or water-powered machine tools for reliable 
cutting and forming of brass or iron parts. Such tools, themselves, depended on 
the quality of metal and the prior availability of adequate machine tools and 
measuring devices. (Thus, the early evolution of the machine tool industry was, 
to a degree, technologically self-limiting.) The later success of the automobile 
could not have occurred without the prior existence of a sophisticated machine 
tool industry as well as a sophisticated iron and steel industry. Above all, the 
automobile (and the aircraft) depended on the prior development of a light- 
weight reliable propulsion system, the internal combustion engine (ICE) [13]. 
The growth of the steel industry after 1860 also perfectly exemplifies the 
overcoming of a major barrier originating in the laws of nature. The smelting of 
iron ore to pig iron (141 requires only maximum furnace temperatures of the 
order of 1100°C. Such temperatures have been achievable with the help of 
power-driven bellows since the late Middle Ages. The pig iron is brittle and not 
useful as an engineering material without further refining to eliminate impurities 
and excess carbon. However, to convert tonnage quantities of pig iron to pure 
malleable (bar) iron, or to low-carbon steel, temperatures in excess of 1540°C are 
needed. This was impossible to achieve until 1740, and then only in very small 
quantities (by Huntsman's crucible method). Henry Bessemer first solved the 
temperature problem in the 1850s by blowing air rapidly through molten pig iron 
in a "converter". Kelly, in the USA, found the same solution to the problem at  
about the same time. It happens that oxygen in the air combines preferentially 
with the carbon and other impurities in the iron, resulting in a spectacular burst 
of fireworks, but leaving pure molten iron. The heat of rapid combustion of the 
carbon also raises the temperature of the iron to the needed level of 1540°C or 
more. (Soon afterward, Siemens and Martin introduced a slower but more con- 
trollable method of achieving the temperatures needed to refine steel, the so- 
called "open hearthn process.) 
The marginal benefits of increasing furnace temperatures by 50% from, 
say, 1300" to 1350°C were comparatively slight, because no major new indus- 
trial capability was created thereby. Thus, when the "state of the artn was 
1300°C, moderate improvements were not worth much. On the other hand, the 
marginal value of increasing furnace temperatures from 1500°C to 1550°C was 
enormous, because the latter temperature was the key to large-scale steel- 
making. It was the perception of this opportunity that inspired Bessemer, Kelly, 
Siemens, Martin, and others to undertake the necessary R&D. 
It is interesting to note that further incremental improvements, say from 
1550°C to 160OoC, would have been worth much less. But, once the great Besse- 
mer steel breakthrough had been made, a host of collateral inventions became 
possible. To begin with, these included variants and improvements on the steel 
production process itself. The most important of these was the 
Thomas-Gilchrist process for making steel from pig iron with a high phosphorus 
content. There followed many applications of the "new" engineering material 
that had formerly been scarce and expensive. Later developments attributable 
to the availability of steel included large steel structures - such as suspension 
bridges and skyscrapers - steel wheels for railroad cars, armor plate, barbed 
wire, "tin" cans, galvanized roofing sheets, and mass-produced automobiles, to 
name but a few. 
If Bessemer steel was "almost the greatest invention" 1151, the first practi- 
cal steam-electric generating plant and distribution network built by Edison in 
1882 must have been the greatest breakthrough of all. The availability of 
electricity in large quantities, beginning in the 1890s, made possible the 
widespread use of safe and convenient electric light (161, plus electric household 
appliances such as water heaters, washing machines, and irons. It also permitted 
electric drive for trams and street railways and for industrial machinery (replac- 
ing the nineteenth-century system whereby machines received power via belts 
from a single shaft driven by a steam engine). The rapidly spreading availability 
of electricity was also a major spur to the development of telecommunication and 
electronics technology. Each of the above applications of electric power led to the 
creation of major industrial branches and hundreds of thousands - ultimately 
millions - of jobs. 
Two of the less obvious but equally significant results of the electric power 
breakthrough are worthy of mention, namely, electric arc furnaces and electro- 
lytic cells. Heroult's electric arc furnace (c. 1900) was a vital prerequisite to 
further progress in metallurgy, since many important steel and other alloying 
elements melt a t  temperatures higher than iron. Electric furnaces were capable 
of reaching temperatures above 2000°C for the first time in human history. The 
list of products that became possible as a direct result of this achievement 
includes calcium carbide (acetylene), carborundum, silicon carbide and other 
refractory ceramics, so-called ferroalloys, tungsten carbide, and most of the 
superalloys and exotic metals now used for gas turbine engines, rocket motors, 
and the like. 
Electrolytic cells, in turn, were needed for commercial production of metal- 
lic sodium, chlorine, and aluminum, as well as for the refining of pure copper and 
the electroplating industry. Without aluminurn, in turn, airplanes would never 
have been practical, and the aerospace industry could not exist today. In other 
words, a viable aircraft industry became economically feasible only after alumi- 
num made from electricity became commercially available in large amounts. 
Similarly, the large-scale availability of acetylene (from calcium carbide made in 
electric furnaces) and chlorine made by electrolysis led to a plethora of impor- 
tant developments in chemical technology. To  cite only one example, polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC) - still one of the most important plastics - is a polymer of vinyl 
chloride, which was originally derived from acetylene and chlorine. In fact, 
much of modern industrial chemistry can be traced back directly or indirectly to 
the commercial introduction of acetylene and chlorine in the 1890s. 
Breakthroughs presuppose barriers. Whenever it can be said that A 
is(was) a prerequisite for B, it is also not unlikely that lack of A is(was) a barrier 
to the achievement of B. The existence of such barriers is inherent in the laws of 
nature and the properties of matter. A comprehensive historical survey of past 
technological barriers and breakthroughs would be a major undertaking and out 
of place here. The point that needs to be made is that, contrary to the assump- 
tion in most economic treatments of the subject, technological progress is not a 
simple or linear function of R&D invested. In short, the probability of a major 
innovation depends very critically on the state of the supporting technology a t  
the time [17]. While a scientific or technical breakthrough is likely to be antici- 
pated by many experts in the field, it is also likely to be unexpected by those 
outside the field in question. Yet the implications may cross many boundaries. 
Hence, economic opportunities are greatest, and the cost of innovation is lowest, 
just after a scientific or technological breakthrough, especially one that has not 
been widely anticipated. Conversely, opportunities decline and costs rise as a 
new barrier is closely approached. 
The Nature of Barriers 
A brief discussion of the nature of technological barriers is in order a t  this point. 
Generally speaking, they can be characterized as (i) peculiarities of the 
landscape, as when a hidden discontinuity (or chasm) only reveals itself as one 
approaches across a seemingly flat plain; or (ii) as distortions of perspective, as 
when a distant mountain appears much closer and smaller than it really is. The 
history of nuclear fusion research illustrates the former problem perfectly. The 
fusion-based H-bomb followed so closely after the fission-based U235 or P239 
bombs that most scientists at first assumed that controlled fusion reactors would 
not be much more difficult to achieve than controlled fission reactors. It was not 
so, however. Further research soon revealed the chasm: a class of previously 
unknown magneto-hydrodynamic instabilities that would plague any known 
magnetic containment system for a high-temperature plasma. Progress in fusion 
research continues, gradually and slowly, but the earliest date of a practical 
fusion power plant retreats year by year. It is now clear that this date must be 
several decades into the twenty-first century. 
Supersonic flight offers another example. It was once assumed that aircraft 
flight speeds would increase more or less smoothly as engine power was 
increased. Not so. Again, a discontinuity was found. Near the speed of sound 
("Mach 1") turbulence increases sharply, and the power required to exceed sonic 
speed rises in a sharply nonlinear fashion. Thus, the supersonic Concorde uses 
several times as much fuel per passenger-km as its subsonic rivals, and the 
deluxe Concorde service operates at a loss, even with premium prices and mas- 
sive government subsidies for the production of the planes. 
Most barriers, however, are not due to special unrecognized problems - like 
the hidden chasm - but to simple inability to judge technological "distance" 
accurately. For instance, Charles Babbage sharply underestimated the cost and 
time required to build his famous mechanical "difference engine" from metal 
parts, simply because he was a mathematician with no practical engineering 
knowledge. Often, as in Babbage's case, it is an ancillary technology that is 
inadequate 1181. The importance of steel springs to navigation has been men- 
tioned. For steel-making it was the ancillary technology of insulation and heat 
retention - thermal engineering - that was inadequate. The problem of manu- 
facturing "interchangeable partsn - a recognized military goal as early as 1717 
that was not fully achieved until the 1880s - was that,  until then, the composi- 
tion of iron and steel alloys could not be controlled precisely enough to make 
high-production machine tools accurate enough [19]. 
The self-powered road vehicle (automobile) and its cousin, the self-powered 
flying machine, were also anticipated long ago. Like the calculating engine, they 
turned out to be much more difficult to achieve than the early visionaries real- 
ized. The primary problem in both cases was lack of a motive power source that 
was sufficiently light and compact. A secondary [but not trivial) problem was to 
build a frame or body that was light enough yet strong enough to withstand the 
considerable stresses involved in use. Unfortunately, until the end of the 
nineteenth century (and even later), nobody knew how to calculate either the 
dynamic forces or the response of various body or frame members. Progress was 
therefore severely inhibited by lack of scientific knowledge. Another key 
mechanical component - the ball bearing - also first became available in the 
1880s, and was quickly applied lo the bicycle. In fact, bicycle technology was of 
critical importance, and it was no accident that the Wright brothers were bicycle 
builders. In any case, the engineering difficulties were far greater than could be 
imagined by even the most sophisticated physicist circa 1850. 
Underestimation of difficulties has characterized computer applications 
from the start.  One of the first research projects undertaken by IBM computer 
scientists in the mid-1950s was a program to translate English to Russian and 
vice versa [20]. Needless to say, although research continues, no satisfactory 
translation program has yet been unveiled to the public. 
Another classic example of underestimation appears to be Herbert Simon's 
celebrated prediction in the 1960s that computers with "artificial intelligence" 
(AI) would be capable of defeating the best human chess players in 10 years. 
Simon was perhaps assuming a higher level of research intensity to develop A1 
than was forthcoming initially, but investment in the field has been growing 
rapidly for years and is now at  a significant level by any standard. A large 
number of computers in various institutions have been programmed to play 
chess, and the former Soviet world champion Mikhail Botvinnik now spends 
much of his time working with one such group. Nevertheless, the best chess- 
playing computers are still significantly inferior to the best human players, and 
the progress of computers in this field has slowed. Nobody is predicting any 
more how long it will take for A1 to overcome the gap. 
A more mundane example is also illuminating. A barrier to truly efficient 
airline operation was the unavailability, until the 1970s, of an adequate comput- 
erized passenger reservation system. Such systems had been under development 
since the late 1950s, but the inherent difficulty of the task was grossly underes- 
timated, and the first several versions were so plagued by breakdowns and errors 
that they were almost more trouble than benefit to the airlines. On the other 
hand, when such systems finally did become operational in the 1970s, they gave 
enormous competitive advantages to the airlines that successfully developed and 
owned them (American Airlines and United Airlines). 
The use of computers to control manufacturing is another task whose 
difficulty was massively underestimated by early enthusiasts such as Norbert 
Wiener (1948) and John Diebold (1952). In the introduction to his famous book 
Cybernetics, Wiener speculated: 
The automatic factory, the assembly line without human agents, are only so 
far ahead of us as is limited by our willingness to put such a degree of effort 
as was set, for example, in the development of radar in the second world 
war. 
In fact, for controlling some continuous processes, such as hot rolling or 
petroleum refining, Wiener's optimistic assessment was not grossly in error. 
However, nearly four decades later, the computerized control of discrete parts 
manufacturing and assembly operations has been partially realized in only a few 
showpiece factories, mainly in Japan. Every such factory is still unique. 
Other examples of underestimation of difficulties (or overestimation of 
opportunities) have been discussed in detail by Freeman (1982). 
Just occasionally, however, a technological problem turns out to be easier 
to solve than the "experts" think. This may happen because the problem had 
- - 
not been clearly articulated, except perhaps by a few people. Once in a while, 
the solution also turns out to be unexpectedly easy, or it may exist already in 
another field. This probably explains the few but interesting cases of "a solution 
- - 
seeking a problem". 
The transistor and the integrated circuit perhaps best exemplify this situa- 
tion. The problem Bell Telephone Laboratories set out to solve, around 1940, 
was that demand for telephone switching equipment (electromechanical relays) 
was growing so fast that it would predictably consume huge amounts of electric 
power by the 1960s. This was a problem, however, visible mainly to a few senior 
executives in the Bell system. Could a simple low-power switching device be 
found? 
It turned out that the phenomenon of impurity semi-conduction, known in 
certain transitional metals, dffered an effective approach. By modern standards, 
the search was relatively short and cheap; a three-man team at Bell Laboratories 
did most of the work. By 1948, transistors had been successfully fabricated and 
tested in circuits, and means of manufacturing had been developed. Instead of 
exploiting the technology in house, however, the technology was made available 
to licensees [21]. The monolithic integrated circuit, announced in 1958-1959, 
was also developed rather quickly and inexpensively at Texas Instruments and 
Fairchild Semiconductor in response to a need to simplify the assembly of com- 
plex circuits from large numbers of discrete components. What few people 
understood a t  first was that these solid-state devices would also soon solve 
another problem that was only beginning to be recognized by 1950: the inherent 
unreliability of electronic devices utilizing vacuum tubes. Integrated circuits 
quickly revolutionized all of electronics, most of all the electronic computer 1221. 
An Expanding Frontiers Model of the Life Cycle 
In view of the points made about breakthroughs and barriers in the last two sec- 
tions, a reinterpretation of the product life cycle seems called for. The sort of 
major innovation that  initiates such a cycle often occurs because of a technologi- 
cal breakthrough, often in another field. Such a break-through typically makes 
available a new engineering material, a new sensing or control capability, greater 
power, speed, temperature or pressure, a new type of energy-conversion device, 
or a new manufacturing process. One is almost irresistibly drawn to a familiar 
metaphor: the westward expansion of the USA during the nineteenth century. 
Each time a political or topographical barrier was overcome (the Appalachians, 
the French-Indian Alliance, the Mississippi, the Rockies, the warlike Sioux and 
Blackfeet tribes, the Mexicans), colol~ists poured into and occupied the newly 
opened territories. In so doing, they created the jumping off conditions for the 
next phase of expansion. 
I have argued above that most major clusters of innovations follow the con- 
quest of a significant technological barrier. The territory beyond such a barrier 
is little known ("terra incognita"), a t  first, because either the means or the 
motives for exploring it are lacking. But, once the barrier is surmounted, all is 
changed: a new territory suddenly opens for exploration and dominion. The rush 
to claim ownership over virgin technological territory is closely analogous to the 
land rushes (or gold rushes) of the nineteenth century 1231. Land was claimed by 
homesteaders or miners under rules set by the federal government. Technologi- 
cal territory is normally claimed by patents, also under rules set by government. 
The detailed similarities - and differences - between a gold rush or a major 
oil strike and a "technology rush" need not concern us unduly a t  this stage. The 
important feature of both processes is that  the economic payoff per unit of 
exploratory (R&D) effort is likely to increase, a t  first, as the number of coloniz- 
ers increase, because they can create and share a common knowledge base or 
"infrastructure". In the case of a new agricultural or mineral territory, the 
infrastructure means access to transportation, processing, and customers. In the 
case of a new technology, it means the accumulation of common basic knowledge 
of measuring or fabricating techniques, for instance. 
Later, however, the economic payoff per unit of R&D effort is likely to 
decline sharply as the best available locations (or concepts) are preempted. 
Thus, the probability of improving significantly on the performance-level state of 
the ar t  tends to decline as the state of the art itself advances. In economic 
language, the marginal product of R&D in any established field tends to 
decrease. In mundane berms, the cost of an increment cf progress in a technol- 
ogy increases with the level of the technology. 
The increasing cost of achieving decreasing degrees of improvements in 
product or process technology is a recognized fact of life in the R&D laboratory. 
Anecdotal evidence abounds, and few R&D managers would dispute the point. 
Unfortunately, quantitative data are surprisingly scarce. This is partly because 
expenditures on industrial R&D are seldom published and partly because it is 
very difficult to find examples in which expenditures can be allocated to  improve- 
ments along a well-defined axis or measure of performance. Perhaps the best 
available data  are from a classic study of petroleum refining (Enos, 1962). 
Prior to 1913, the only fuel available for use by automobiles and trucks was 
natural gasoline, or naphtha, obtained by a distillation process developed in the 
1870s. Naphtha is defined in terms of its "boiling" range: 75-350°F. The naph- 
tha  fraction varied with the source of crude oil, but was typically around 25%. 
Higher-range boiling fractions - illuminating oils (350-60O0F), and lubricating 
oils, waxes, and residual oils (600-1000°F) - constituted around 66% of the total 
mass and had a very low market value compared to  motor gasoline. 
T o  increase the yield of motor gasoline, it was necessary to  "crack" the 
heavier fractions. The first cracking process, developed by Burton in 1913, used 
heat and pressure as the cracking agents and doubled the gasoline yield per bar- 
rel of crude oil (Enos, 1962: p. 23). It also raised the average research octane 
number (RON) from about 50 for natural gasoline to  55. This advantage was 
not recognized, a t  first, but later became important when it was realized that 
higher octanes would permit higher engine compression ratios and, consequently, 
greater fuel economy. 
Processes introduced since Burton's original thermal cracking development 
have increased the maximum gasoline yield per barrel of oxide to  around 75%: 
the U.S. average is around 55%. But research octane number (RON) has 
increased dramatically, from 55 to  95. As shown in Table 4, the improved 
processes introduced in 1922, 1936, and 1942 successively resulted in perfor- 
mance improvements over the previous process of 21.7%, 35.3%, and 25.3%, 
respectively. There was no further performance improvement after 1942. 
Cracking process innovations also resulted in reduced raw material, labor, 
and process energy costs, which were initially translated into profits for produc- 
ers (return on investment) and later into savings for gasoline consumers. It is 
interesting to  note that the new processes each resulted in significant improve- 
ments in the product (gasoline) but usually a t  some initial penalty in labor, capi- 
tal or energy productivity. These penalties were invariably eliminated quickly by 
subsequent process improvements. 
The major point illustrated by Table 4 is, of course, that  the cost of each 
incremental improvement, whether in product or in process, rose dramatically. 
The R&D cost of the original Burton cracking process was only $92,000. Succes- 
sive new processes cost $7 million, $11 million and, $15 million, respectively, to 
reach the introduction stage. Dramatic improvements in factor productivity were 
later made in each process, but the R&D costs were also much higher for the 
later processes. Since 1955, refinery processes have been improved, but only to  a 
minor extent, and further major process innovations seem quite unlikely. 
Table 4. Marginal returns to R&D on cracked gasoline. Source: data from Enos (1962). 
Comparisons 
Improved Burton process 
(1922; scale factor x 3) 
v. "original" Burton 
process (1913) 
New continuous thermal 
processes (1922; scale 
570 bbl/day) v. improved 
Burton processes (1922) 
Improved continuous 
process (1938; scale 
factor x 12) v. 
original continuous 
process (1922) 
New Houdry catalytic 
process (1938; scale 
6750 bbl/day) ;. 
improved conttnuous 
process (1938) 
Improved Houdry (1940; 
scale factor x 2) v. 
original Houdry 
process (1938) 
New fluid process (1942; 
scale 2750 bbl/day) 
v. improved Houdry 
process (1940) 
Improved fluid process 
(1955; scale factor x 3) 
R&D 
costs 
$(OOO) 
(a) 
7,000 (a) 
Percentage improvement in productivity of: 
Process 
Gasoline Labor Capital Energy 
(b) (c) (dl (el 
N.A. +623% +200% +87% 
". original fluid 
(1942) > 15,000 0 +225% +SO% +333% 
(a) Including R&D costs for both Dubbs process and 'Tube & Tankn process prior to 1922 
(Enos, 1962: Table 6,  p.  238). 
(b)  Measured in terms of ton-miles a t  40 mph, to take into account higher engine compres- 
sion ratios permitted by higher octaves (Enos, 1962: Table A, p. 271). 
(c) Productivity measured as gallons of cracked gasoline per manhour process labor. 
(d) Productivity measured as gallons of cracked gasoline per dollar of capital (19398). 
(e) Productivity measured as gallons of cracked gasoline per million BTU. 
A recently published book by management consultant Richard N. Foster 
(1986) documents two other cases of declining productivity of R&D in quantita- 
tive terms. Figure 2 shows a measure of two chemical processes as a function of 
cumulative R&D man-hours. As it happens, the two processes were direct com- 
petitors, insofar as naphthalene and orthoxylene (0-xylene) are alternative 
feedstocks for an important industrial chemical, phthalic anhydride. Evidently, 
the naphthalene-based technology was initially more efficient. But a t  the same 
time the newer orthoxylene-based technology was improving more rapidly, with 
a greater fractional improvement per unit of R&D investment, mainly because 
its theoretical maximum yield (of phthalic anhydride) was higher. Foster argues 
that the "defenders" in this case (Allied and Monsanto) should have deem- 
phasized naphthalene a t  an earlier stage and switched their R&D to orthoxylene 
or simply licensed the new technology (as Monsanto eventually did). 
Cumulative R& D effort (man- years) 
Figure  2. R&D productivity for two industrial chemicals: 0-xylene and naphthalene 
(Foster, 1986). 
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Figure 9. R&D productivity for tire cords: cotton, rayon, nylon, and polyester (Foster, 
1986). 
An even more interesting case of multiple substitution is shown in Figure 3, 
which shows the returns to R&D for rayon, nylon, and polyester tire cords meas- 
ured against a common index of performance. Again, the decline in R&D yield 
for each technology is clearly evident. In fact, the first $60 million invested in 
rayon tire cord technology before 1962 resulted in an 800% increase in perfor- 
mance. The next $15 million resulted in a much more modest (but still 
significant) 25% improvement, while the last $25 million gained a mere 5% in 
performance. By that time nylon was already superior, but also rapidly 
approaching its limits (apparently unknown to Dupont), whereas the "adoles- 
cent" polyester technology was rapidly improving. In fact, Foster (1986) cites 
many cases where a younger, more dynamic technology has an R&D yield 5 to 
20 times greater than an established competitor approaching its inherent limits. 
For this reason, picking the right technology to develop (in terms of its life cycle) 
is of critical importance to competitive success. 
Mechanisms 
Processes that accelerate at the outset and later decelerate, can be explained in 
terms of positive and negative feedback processes. During the acceleration stage, 
the feedback is positive. Later, the feedback becomes negative and the process 
decelerates. Examples of such processes in nature include autocatalytic chemical 
processes and biological growth; see, e.g., Lotka (1956: Chapter 111) and von 
Bertalanffy (1957). Derek de Solla Price (1963) was one of the first to recognize 
the closeness of the analogy between such natural processes and scientific pro- 
gress. Similar ideas were developed by Lenz (1962) and by Hartman and Isenson 
(cited in Jantsch, 1967: Chapter 11.3). The latter two authors each derived 
detailed models for forecasting the rate of change of the "state of knowledge" as 
a function of time, in terms of such variables as the number of investigators in a 
field, the "productivity factor" for a scientist, and a "reaction cross-section" to 
reflect the probability that an encounter between two scientists working in the 
field will generate new knowledge. 
Both the Isenson and Hartman models predict S-shaped curves for the 
growth of knowledge in a newly opened territory. Simple approximations in both 
cases lead to the well-known "logistic" equation 1241 for x: 
where x is any measure of knowledge (on technological performance), k is a 
growth constant and y is an upper limit, presumably based on interest physical 
factors. This equation is integrable and its solution is well known, viz, 
The logistic function above is a special case, in that it is perfectly symmetrical 
around the time to, which is also the point of inflection of the S-curve. Neverthe- 
less, the simple equation is widely used for explaining the growth and substitu- 
tion of new technologies for old ones [25] as shown, for instance, by Mansfield 
(1961), Fisher and Pry (1971), Blackman (1972 and 1974), and Marchetti (1977). 
Unfortunately, the diffusion of innovations is often not a symmetrical pro- 
cess in time: sometimes the process of diffusion slows down; in other cases, it 
speeds up (Gold et al., 1970; Mahajan and Wind, 1985). A number of alternative 
innovation-diffusion models have been introduced since the late 1960s by, e.g., 
Floyd (1968), Bass (1969), Sharif and Kabir (1976), and Easingwood et al. 
(1983); but none is perfectly general. Also, the more general models, e.g., by 
Sharif and Kabir and by Easingwood et al., are not integrable, except numeri- 
cally (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985). This is a severe limitation for the practi- 
tioner, since non-integrable equations are very difficult to fit. The difficulty has 
been partially relieved, recently, by Skiadas (1985), who has introduced two 
integrable models that are capable of reflecting almost any S-type curve. Recent 
work by Peschel and Mende (1986) suggests that a general class of "hyperlogis- 
ticn equations may be appropriate. Except for the Bass model, however, none of 
the generalized innovation-diffusion models can claim to  be derived from under- 
lying microeconomic or behavioral principles. They are essentially phenom- 
enological in nature. 
However, from the larger perspective adopted here, the correct specification 
of an innovation-diffusion model is much less important than the fact that the 
S-shaped curve, in one form or another, is a fairly good description of the 
phenomena of innovation and diffusion as they actually occur. The most univer- 
sal characteristic of the phenomenon is growth followed by maturity: growth is 
an accelerating rate of change in the technological measure due to positive feed- 
back. Maturity is a stage defined by a decelerating rate of change, owing to 
negative feedback as the technology measure approaches a plateau. This occurs 
because the "new territory" is fully occupied and its potentialities are exhausted. 
In short, the dynamic "frontiers" model clearly suggests that the 
phenomena of maturity and senescence associated with the industry life cycle can 
best be explained in terms of declining technological opportunity. Putting it 
another way, the model suggests that the major reason for slow observed techni- 
cal change nowadays, in such established technologies as steel-making, glass- 
making, steam engines, internal combustion engines, power transmissions, 
hydraulic turbines, machine tools (except for controls) and so forth, is that the 
last major breakthroughs in those technologies occurred many decades ago. In 
each case, a major barrier now stands in  the way of further progress. In most 
cases, it is probably due to practical limits in the strength of engineering materi- 
als (especially at elevated temperatures). Significant progress in materials sci- 
ence could thus set off a chain reaction of collateral advances in other technolo- 
gies. In some other cases, the effective barrier may be sheer complexity and 
what has been called "the tyranny of numbers" [26]. 
Much more could be said about the reasons for a slowdown in innovation 
toward the end of a life cycle. One early economic discussion of the topic is by 
Brozen (1951). One reason has been discussed in the specific context of the auto 
industry by Abernathy (1978), and in a more general context by the present 
author (Ayres, 1984); it can be summarized in Abernathy's phrase: the "produc- 
tivity dilemman. In brief, as an industry matures it begins to compete more and 
more in terms of price. Standardization of products and domination of the 
industry by a few large producers permit the use of very specialized, dedicated 
capital equipment. This, in turn, implies that any change in the product necessi- 
tates a major capital writeoff, which is treated as a loss by present-day accoun- 
tants. The bigger the writeoff, therefore, the less the motivation for making 
changes. 
I t  is important to emphasize that the "frontiers" model is not necessarily 
incompatible with conventional economic theory, although it involves exogenous 
elements. What is suggested, here, is a modification of the standard theory 
insofar as it treats R&D as a search for unspecified product or process improve- 
ments. The proposed model would also take into account the existing state of 
process and product technology and of the market. Market pull and technologi- 
cal opportunity are surely complementary. Both must exist, but they need not 
be equally important. Often the pull is strong, but the opportunities are 
minimal; the result is cosmetic change, or none at all. Once in a while, however, 
the opportunity is clear, but the pull is unfocused and hard to recognize. This is 
the tougher challenge, by far, both for entrepreneurs and theorists. 
Technological Opportunity 
A natural definition of technological opportunity emerges from the previous dis- 
cussion. In brief, a period of great opportunity ezists when and where a small 
incremental improvement in some technology would sufice to  surmount a major 
long-standing barrier. The opportunities do not necessarily exist in the same 
field as the barrier. If they did, opportunities would be much easier to recognize. 
The essential point is that breaking through a barrier almost always creates new 
collat era1 opportunities. The most critical question for an entrepreneur is: how 
can potential opportunities be recognized in advance (i.e., ahead of the competi- 
tion)? 
The assessment of technological opportunity, in practice, involves three 
observable factors: ( I )  the performance improvement factor vis-kvis a known 
barrier, (2) the rate of progress that can be expected in the near term, and (3) 
the identification of collateral benefits. The first two observable factors can be 
assessed only by technical experts, while the third lies in a kind of intermediate 
domain. It may be postulated that entrepreneurs can, and do, estimate their 
potential gains by using these three kinds of information in conjunction with 
economic knowledge about the market (i.e., the demand curve) and of their own 
costs (i.e., the supply curve). But, in practice, this knowledge tends to be quite 
imprecise and harder to quantify than most planners admit [27]. 
To summarize: it is suggested here that important innovations occur in 
clusters, after a breakthrough that opens up a new, unexplored territory. It is 
hard to doubt that innovations are made by entrepreneurs seeking supernormal 
profits from technology-based monopoly. However, it is not necessary to suppose 
that any sort of formal utility (or profit) maximization is involved. In fact, the 
decision process governing entrepreneurs' specific R&D investments remains 
largely unexplained. How does an entrepreneur decide between long-term risky 
investments in the hope of a major breakthrough versus short-term, less risky 
investments in improvements to existing products or processes? What is the 
optimum level of investment? What is the optimum pace for expanding produc- 
tion of a new product? What is the best price policy for a new product? 
The most productive working hypothesis may be that technological 
entrepreneurs in a new field tend to seek opportunities where a perceived 
demand is matched to a comparative advantage on the supply side. In other 
words, the technological entrepreneur is an opportunist, hoping to cash in on 
some preexisting knowledge (i.e., comparative advantage) that is not yet widely 
diffused. 
In the evolution of a field of technology, the most important discoveries and 
the most valuable inventions tend to  occur early, while by far the greatest 
number of individual advances occur much later, after the field is established. 
Indeed, it is almost always possible for the entrepreneur to know ez ante whether 
a successful R&D outcome would be a minor or major improvement or a break- 
through. One question yet to be answered is what information the entrepreneur 
uses to arrive a t  this judgment. 
In cases such as biotechnology today, where a successful R&D outcome will 
predictably result in a large (i.e., order of magnitude) improvement in either the 
performance of some biological product or its cost, in terms of service yield per 
dollar, the entrepreneur will be correspondingly more strongly motivated to 
succeed. Ceterts partbus, he will invest more in the search, to  cover as many pos- 
sibilities as he can, as fast as he can. Of course, any such opportunity is likely to 
be known to  many others, so in principle the entrepreneur will face greater com- 
petition - possibly from larger and better-financed rivals. This certainly increases 
the risk and reduces the odds of any clear-cut victory in the race. The essential 
point is that entrepreneurs generally do have a reasonably good idea of the value 
of the potential opportunity, ez ante. 
It will be argued elsewhere that  firms can have different effective time 
preferences (discount rates) in different circumstances on the basis of external 
threats and/or opportunities [28]. It would seem equally plausible that  aggregate 
technological investment behavior should vary over time for similar reasons. At 
times of relatively low external threat (i.e., steadily expanding markets for exist- 
ing products; no excess supply), the effective internal discount rate is positive, 
and there is no reason to take big risks on radical new technologies. They are 
likely to  remain on the shelf in such periods. However, a t  times of depression, 
market saturation, and/or rapid expansion of capacity by low-cost suppliers, the 
effective internal discount rate may well be small enough (or negative) to justify 
risky investments with long-term payoffs. 
Economic  Impl ica t ions  of t h e  Life Cycle  Mode l  
I have reviewed some of the economic and technological evidence supporting a 
dynamic expanding frontiers model of the technology life cycle. I t  is now 
appropriate to reverse the argument and ask: supposing the proposed dynamic 
model to  be "validn (whatever that may mean), what would it imply in terms of 
the major debates in the literature? Three topics are of particular interest: 
(1) The classic technology-push versus market-pull argument implicitly rests 
on the existence of a static equilibrium. In the life cycle of a technology, 
the balance between push and pull changes over time. In the very early 
period, technology push may be quite important. In some extreme cases, 
"Say's lawn is applicable: supply creates its own demand. This was almost 
certainly true of X-rays, penicillin, nylon, DDT, lasers, and genetic 
engineering, to name six examples. None were expected or explicitly sought 
in advance. They arose out of fundamental research programs yet found 
practical applications almost immediately. 
Later in the life cycle, pull takes over. Its function is to induce a col- 
lection of competing entrepreneurs to find an optimum balance between 
product performance and price for the customer vis-A-vis profitability for 
the producer. The relative importance of pull over time may be measured 
roughly in terms of price elasticity of aggregate demand. The more mature 
an industry, the lower the price elasticity, and the smaller the potential for 
further market expansion. However, the cross-elasticity of demand for any 
one firm's product increases, which is to say that the product becomes 
more "commodity-like". 
In summary, the importance of push is likely to be highest at the very 
beginning of the life cycle. As the initial innovator-monopolist is chal- 
lenged by many imitators, however, pull forces become dominant. Later 
still, in the mature phase, the effect of pull also declines. 
(2) The classic argument as to whether technology is an exogenous or an 
endogenous factor in economic growth is also predicated on a static equilib- 
rium picture. Even Schmookler (1966), who perhaps gathered the most evi- 
dence in support of the endogenous view, acknowledged the existence of an 
irreducible exogenous element. (Six examples of unexpected and somewhat 
surprising innovations were listed above.) On the other hand, most 
discoveries and inventions are not really surprising, except to observers 
lacking scientific and technological knowledge. 
There is nothing at all surprising about the existence of an exogenous 
component, once it is acknowledged that the rate and direction of techno- 
logical progress depends, in part, on the state of science and technology 
itself. Since scientific knowledge is (by definition) never complete, there is 
always some chance of a surprise coming out of the laboratory. By the 
same token, knowledge of human reactions - hence of marketplace 
responses - is also incomplete. Thus, surprises can also occur on the 
demand side [29]. 
In any case, I have argued in this paper that the conventional 
demand-side interpretation of R&D investment behavior must be comple- 
mented by a supply-side analysis of technological opportunity, which is an 
explicit function of the current state, and rate of change, of science and 
technology per se. 
(3) One of the most interesting of the current debates among economists con- 
cerns the relationship of technological change and the so-called Kondratieff 
long cycle or long wave, first noted in terms of wholesale commodity prices. 
The phenomenon was originally discovered by van Gelderen (1913) and 
later analyzed by a number of other, mainly Dutch economists. However, 
the classic studies were those of the Soviet economist N.D. Kondratieff 
(1926 and 1928). In his analysis of business cycles, Schumpeter (1939) 
tried to explain the long cycle in terms of "heroicn technological innova- 
tions - notably, steam power (1818-1842), electrification (1882-1930), and 
automobiles (1898-1940). Schumpeter's theory was immediately challenged 
by Kuznets (1940), who asked two cogent questions: 
(a) Is there any evidence of Kondratieff long waves in important indica- 
tors of general economic activity? 
(b) Is there any evidence of a bunching of Schumpeter's heroic innova- 
tions (and, if yes, what is the theoretical explanation)? 
Kuznets' answer to these questions was "non, and he remained a skeptic 
almost forty years later (Kuznets, 1978). Nevertheless, the "long waven has 
been reconsidered in recent years by a number of authors. For a useful 
review of writings by Rostow, Forrester, Mandel, and van Duijn, inter alia, 
see Kleinknecht (1986: Chapter 1). 
In particular, Schumpeter's notion that major technological innovations 
may drive the long cycle has been taken up and carried further by Mensch 
(1975). The centerpiece of Mensch's "metamorphosis theory" is changing invest- 
ment behavior depending on market conditions. Mensch argues that during 
periods of prosperity, when markets are rapidly growing, capital can be rein- 
vested with a high return and little risk in straightforward capacity expansion. 
On the other hand, when existing markets are saturated, the most profitable 
opportunities for capital are offered by investment in new technologies, which 
have meanwhile been accumulating on the shelf. Mensch believes that major 
depressions have occurred because the marketplace is too slow to withdraw capi- 
tal from mature or post-mature sectors (such as steel) and shift it to faster grow- 
ing sectors. 
It is evident that the dynamic life cycle model of technological change, 
presented in sketch form in this paper, is consistent with Mensch's ideas about 
investment behavior. It could help explain the long cycle if the long cycle is 
"real". While major peaks and valleys in economic activity on a roughly 50-60- 
year time scale have been observed, their statistical significance is still unclear. 
However, given the occurrence of a major economic depression for any reason, 
Mensch's theory implies that this should be a peak in the rate of major innova- 
tion. Conversely, during a period of general prosperity, the theory implies that 
the rate of major innovation should be low. In this connection, see Ayres and 
Mori (1987). 
It is worth noting that this expectation seems to conflict with Schmookler's 
(1966) empirical evidence on the correlation of patent activity and economic 
activity. However, as pointed out earlier, the conflict is not necessarily irreconcil- 
able, because Schmookler's data ipso jacto related primarily to the behavior of 
already established industries and did not attempt to measure the clustering of 
major innovations in relation to general economic conditions. On the clustering 
question, some supporting evidence was presented by Mensch, although it has 
been criticized sharply by Freeman et al. (1982), Mansfield (1983), and others. 
Meanwhile, additional data has been gathered by Freeman et al., Kleinknecht 
(1986), and others. The jury is still out, although it seems increasingly clear that 
some degree of clustering has occurred. What is not yet clear is whether the 
observed clustering phenomenon is accidental or whether the "causesn are essen- 
tially economic or essentially technological or political/military. Moreover, it is 
unclear whether the apparent clustering of major innovations is causally linked 
to the Kondratieff cycle (Rosenberg and Frischtak, 1984). On all these matters, 
more research is needed. 
Notes 
[l] The idea of an 'aging" process goes back, in part a t  least, to the German econo- 
mist Wolff, whose ideas were cited by, among others, Kuznets (1930). "Wolff's 
law" asserted that  the cost of incremental improvement increases as a technology 
approaches its long-run performance level. A number of other economists of the 
1930s explored the process of industrial succession and displacement, especially in 
the context of business cycles, including Burns, Hansen, Hoffman, and Schumpeter 
(see Schumpeter, 1939). A general "law of industrial growth" was proposed 
(Alderfer and Michl, 1942). In summary, it stated that  industries mature when 
technological progress slows down, resulting in slower cost reductions and market 
expansion. 
[2] The first explicit reference to a technology life cycle I am aware of appears in an 
unpublished report by Ralph Lenz (1962). 
131 The notion of a product life cycle seems to  have originated with Nelson (1962); 
also see Levitt (1965). It was elaborated in a classic paper on international trade 
and investment implicat,ions by Vernon (1966). 
141 The exogenous versus endogenous debate is one of the oldest in economics. A 
major early contribution was made by Hicks (1932), who attributed "induced" 
technological changes t o  factor price differentials. Thus, he explained a bias 
toward labor-saving innovation in the USA, as contrasted to capital- or resource- 
saving innovation in Europe, in terms of differences in wage rates versus capital 
costs. There has been a great deal of research on price-induced innovation in 
recent decades, e.g., by Hayami and Ruttan (1971) and Binswanger e l  al. (1978). 
Another important contribution to the autonomy debate was that  of Jacob 
Schmookler (1966), who carried out a series of longitudinal studies (railroads, farm 
implements, petroleum refining, and paper-making) to elucidate the relationship 
between economic activity and "inventive activity", as measured by patents. 
Schmookler's work strongly supported the endogenous view. Recent work using 
patent da t a  is also reported by Freeman (1982: pp. 53-70). Freeman, however, is 
somewhat critical of Schmookler's use of patent da ta ,  a t  least as a measure of 
"radical" inventions. A useful summary and critique of the literature can be found 
in Mowery and Rosenberg (1979), reprinted in Rosenberg (1982: Chapter 10). 
151 For instance, the continuous catalytic cracking process in petroleum refining was 
developed by a consortium organized for the explicit purpose of inventing around 
the Houdry process (Enos, 1962). 
[6] The so-called experience curve was originally a purely empirical observation about 
trends in production costs as a function of cumulative production, or "experience". 
This idea was formulated as early as the mid-19309, based on da ta  from the air- 
craft industry (Wright, 1936). The relationship was applied to national economic 
performance by the Dutch economist Verdoorn (1949, 1951, and 1956), who for- 
mulated a "law" relating labor productivity and cumulative output. Arrow (1962) 
reformulated the notion in a much more comprehensive theory of economic prog- 
ress, emphasizing the importance of learning in the capital goods industry and the 
embodiment of technological progress in capital, resulting in increased labor pro- 
ductivity. There is a considerable literature on the question of whether technologi- 
cal progress can best be considered to be embodied in capital or labor, or whether 
it is more nearlv disembodied. For instance. see Beckmann and Sato (1969). The 
results are essentially inconclusive. A progress function relating labor produc- 
tivity and output, postulated by Kaldor (1961), was sometimes called "Kaldor's 
lawn. There is a sizeable empirical literature on the subject of progress functions 
or experience curves, e.g., Alchian (1963), Hirsch (1956), Rapping (1965), and 
David (1970). In recent years "experience curvesn have been widely promoted as a 
strategic management tool, e.g., Cunningham (1980). 
[7] Well-documented examples include hand-held calculators, digital watches, com- 
puter games, and personal computers. The number of competitors sometimes falls 
spectacularly at this point; see, e.g., Utterback (1986). Rosegger and Baird (1987) 
have documented the entry and exit of makes in the automobile industry. 
[8] The diffusion literature is extremely voluminous. The first theoretical treatment in 
the economics literature was that of Mansfield (1961 and 1968), who primarily 
emphasized the demand side and the role of profitability for users. His original 
model assumes profitability to new users remains constant over time and, impli- 
citly, that the "diffusion levels reached in later years also represent active adop- 
tion prospects during earlier years" (Gold, 1981). For a modern critique, see 
Metcalfe (1981). A number of attempts have been made to classify users into 
groups with different characteristics, such as "early adopters", "late adoptersn, 
and so on, e.g., Bass (1969). The "supply siden of inventive activity has been dis- 
cussed more explicitly by Machlup (1962) and Nordhaus (1969), among others. 
Recent state-of-the-art reviews can be found in Mahajan and Wind (1986), from 
the marketing perspective, and Stoneman (1983), from the economics'pers~ective. 
See also Wvatt (1986). 
- ,  
An independent literature has evolved around the problem of forecasting techno- 
logical change per se, e.g., Jantsch (1967) and Ayres (1969), with an interesting 
subliterature on the special case of technological substitution, e.g., Fisher and Pry 
(1971). There is an obvious need to bring these two strands together. 
191 According to so-called standard (Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson) static equilibrium 
trade theory, a capital-rich country, such as the USA, should export capital- 
intensive products and import labor-intensive products. In reality, the USA 
exports labor-intensive "high technologyn products and imports capital-intensive 
products of mature industries (Leontief, 1954). 
[10] For the moment, I do not attempt any formal definition. The implicit question of 
comparative valuation raised here is addressed more explicitly later. 
[ll] Much has been written about the history of the telephone. See, for example, 
Goulden (1970). 
[12] Obviously, there are many cases where the initial market is, in fact, a government. 
This was true for aircraft. 
1131 It has been argued, e.g., by Schmookler (1966) and Freeman (1982), that the ICE 
was not a prerequisite, because steam and electric cars were still competing in the 
market as late as 1905 or so. However. the enormous ex~ansion of the industrv (its 
- \ 
adolescent period) occurred after 1908, when automobiles became cheap and reli- 
able enough for ordinary people to use for transportation. Electric cars were easy 
enough to use but had inadequate range (they still do); while steam cars were too 
hard to start, consumed too much fuel, and needed water every few miles. These 
technical disadvantages of steam were later overcome (in the Doble, produced in 
the 1920s), but not at  a competitive price. 
Pig iron consists mainly of a solid solution of iron carbide Fe3C in iron; it con- 
tains 4.5% carbon by weight. 
The distinguished historian Elting Morrison (1966) called the Bessemer process 
"almost the greatest inventionn because of its great economic and social impact. 
In fact, relatively safe and effective gas lighting also became available about the 
same time and was not finally displaced for another three decades or more. 
To  support this point further, Rosegger (1986) has pointed out that Bessemer was 
aware that  his process would work even better using pure oxygen instead of air. 
But oxygen could not be produced economically in bulk until the Linde-Franke 
process was developed in the late 1920s and the BOF itself was delayed until 1952. 
Contrary to popular legend, Babbage's project was probably not technically 
infeasible. But it was undoubtedly underfunded, and Babbage compounded the 
problem by constantly tinkering with the design (Shurkin, 1984). 
The critical   arts of a machine tool have to be made to tolerances an order of 
magnitude lower than the required tolerances of the parts to be made by it. 
This project began in 1953, using the IBM 701 computer, with a CRT-based ran- 
dom access memory of 2048 words. 
A consent agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice, under antitrust laws, 
forced AT&T to license the transistor technology to all comers for a very modest 
royalty. The Japanese were particularly quick to seize the opportunity. 
The first electronic computer (ENIAC) was unveiled in 1946. The transistor was 
announced in 1948. The first transistorized computers appeared c. 1956. 
Gerald Holton (1962) used the "mineral vein" metaphor primarily in the context 
of scientific research. In an earlier book of my own (Ayres, 1969), Chapter 5 intro- 
duced a similar idea. Wyatt (1986: p. 122), has likened researchers (or inventors) 
to "fisherman working a fishing groundn. Thomas Hughes (1971) has used a 
slightly different idea, likening the advance of science and technology to an army 
advancing along a broad front. "Barriers" in Hughes's metaphor are like "reverse 
salientsn or pockets of resistance holding up the front. When such a pocket is 
encountered, very intense efforts may be made to eliminate it. 
The equation itself goes back to Verhulst (1844). 
The progress of a new technology can be thought of as a special case of substitut- 
ing "knowledgen for ignorance, or lack of knowledge. 
The phrase was used by J.A. Morton, Vice-President of Bell Laboratories, to 
characterize the limits of electronic technology as seen in the late 1950s. The lim- 
its were overcome, in this case, by the invention of monolithic integrated circuitry 
and its subsequent evolution to LSI, VLSI, and ULSI. 
See, for example, the good discussion by Freeman (1982: Chapter 7). 
This issue is discussed quantitatively in Ayres and Mori (1987). 
A good discussion of the role of market uncertainties is to be found in Freeman 
(1982). 
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